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Abstract 
The project “Payment for environmental services as a mechanism for promoting rural development in 
the upper watersheds of the tropics” is a research and development project running in four pilot 
catchments in the Andes region. Its overall objective is to alleviate poverty and enhance sustainability in 
upper catchments by increasing the flow of resources from governments and civil society to poor rural 
producers, reducing the negative impact of environmental externalities and strengthening the 
competitive capacity of the poor. DIIS has been given the task to carry out an institutional analysis in 
order to identify key stakeholders in the management of watersheds, their priorities and interests, their 
mutual relations and issues contributing to conflict and cooperation among them. The present Working 
Paper presents the findings from the institutional analysis carried out in Jequetepeque watershed, Peru.  
The paper argues that the introduction of PES schemes takes place in a context of already existing 
institutions and competition over access to land and water. Moreover, the introduction of PES schemes 
itself represents the creation of new forms of rules and regulations (or PES institutions), which might 
shape existing property institutions. The design of PES schemes has to be considered with a view to 
how it might influence the existing institutions governing access to irrigation water and the actual 
distribution of access to irrigation water and vice versa. 
The national water legislation for irrigation constitutes the framework which shapes access and 
management of water for irrigation and thereby also influences the circumstances under which PES 
schemes can be implemented. Two types of water titles can be established. Either water users can 
possess a licencia, which gives a permanent and secure right to water, or a permiso, which only gives rights 
to water if total available quantities exceed the needs of the holders of permanent water rights (licencia)  
Based on an analysis of rural inhabitants’ access to irrigation water, the paper concludes by listing the 
challenges associated with the wish to establish pro-poor PES in the watershed: 
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• The administration and enforcement of the formal regulations on water rights and use is weak 
and in several cases non-existing. In many villages, water users do not pay fees for the water they 
are allocated, or they withdraw water to which they are not entitled according to existing water 
rights. The illegal use of water and lack of payment of fees for legally endorsed water use indicate 
great risks for implementing a PES system based on individual payments. A better understanding 
of who enjoys illegal access to water – i.e. the poor or the non-poor; farmers with secure water 
rights (licencia), with insecure water rights (permiso), or without any water rights – is fundamental to 
assess the poverty impact of strengthening water rights administration in general and introducing 
PES schemes in particular.  
• Secure rights are a pre-condition for the PES market on the supply and the demand site. On the 
supply side, it should be considered to which extent the current land tenure rights, of which many 
remain without legal documents, will affect negatively the possibility of establishing schemes. On 
the supply side, it should be considered how a more secure delivery of water to water right 
holders will improve the security of their rights. Unclear tenure rights constrain the establishment 
of contracts.  
• The current system where some hold licencias and others permisos might cause some water right 
holders to be willing to participate while others do not wish to be involved. As all water users 
benefit from the same source a free-rider problem might occur.   
• Pro-poor impacts of a PES scheme are questionable in the case of Jequetepeque watershed as the 
poorest cannot be targeted as providers or beneficiaries of water services.  
• It should be expected that streams of benefits (cash to providers and improved environmental 
services) are likely to create incentives for elites to take over land or strengthen their water rights. 
Thus safeguards need to be included to guard against elite capture.  
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1. Introduction 
In the Andes region, water resources are becoming increasingly scarce and contested as a growing 
number of industries, rural and urban populations require more water for consumption, agricultural and 
industrial purposes. As scarcity grows, the social and biophysical interdependencies become more 
apparent as natural resource management decisions taken upstream to an increasing extent produce 
downstream outcomes or externalities. The obligation to ensure the provision of environmental 
services often fall on the local natural resource managers, whereas beneficiaries of such services might 
not be aware of the land use practices that are essential for their provision (Kerr, 2002; Zbinden and 
Lee, 2005). Payment for environmental services (PES) is an environmental management instrument 
that uses economic incentives to promote conservation of the environment and the environmental 
services it provides. PES aims at establishing benefit streams, whether in cash or kind, flowing from 
beneficiaries of improved environmental services to the providers of these services.  
The project “Payment for environmental services as a mechanism for promoting rural development in the upper 
watersheds of the tropics”1 is a research and development project, funded by the Global Water and Food 
Challenge Programme and implemented by GTZ-CONDESAN in collaboration with the International 
Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) and the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). The 
first phase of the programme is running from 2004 to 2007 in four pilot catchments (Fuquene, 
Colombia; Ambato, Ecuador; Jequetepeque, Peru; and Tunari, Bolivia).  
Its overall objective is to alleviate poverty and enhance sustainability in upper catchments by increasing 
the flow of resources from governments and civil society to poor rural producers, reducing the negative 
impact of environmental externalities and strengthening the competitive capacity of the poor through 
greater food security, higher incomes, and better administrative and organizational skills (GTZ-
CONDESAN, 2004). As part of the partnership, DIIS has been given the task to carry out an 
institutional analysis in order to identify key stakeholders in the management of watersheds, their 
priorities and interests, their mutual relations and issues contributing to conflict and cooperation among 
them. The present paper constitutes a first attempt to meet this objective for Jequetepeque watershed, 
Peru (see map 1) by analysing the institutions through which access to irrigation water is established. It 
is argued that the design of PES schemes has to be considered with a view to how the PES scheme 
might influence the existing institutions governing access to irrigation water and the actual distribution 
 
1 http://www.condesan.org/cuencasandinas/  
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of access to irrigation water and vice versa how the institutions shaping access to irrigation water might 
influence the design options for a PES scheme.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the research questions and 
methodology of the study. This is followed by a third section describing Jequetepeque watershed and 
the three areas where field research was carried out. The fourth and core section of the paper, analyses 
access to irrigation water and discusses the implications for the design of PES schemes. Finally, section 
five concludes by listing the challenges associated with the wish to establish pro-poor PES in the 
watershed. 
 
Map 1. Jequetepeque watershed 
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2. Research objectives and methodology  
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
Watershed environmental services are linked to certain upstream land areas with high ability to recharge 
aquifers, high storage potential or riparian areas and hillsides of importance to the reduction of erosion 
(see Box 1).  Land property institutions contribute to shape the use and management of such areas. 
Hence, the introduction of PES schemes takes place in a context of already existing institutions and 
competition over access to land. Moreover, the introduction of PES schemes itself represents the 
creation of new forms of rules and regulations (or PES institutions) that might shape existing property 
institutions (Swallow et al., 2005).  
Downstream beneficiaries of watershed environmental services can be e.g. factories, municipal water 
utilities and rural or urban water users. As regards rural beneficiaries of irrigation and consumptive 
water the ability to benefit depends, among other things, on access to land and water.  
Box 1 
 
 (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
• Water regulation: The timing and magnitude of run off, flooding and aquifer recharge. Water regulation is 
influenced by changes in land cover, including alterations that change the water storage potential of the 
system e.g. conversion of wetlands or the replacement of forest with croplands. 
 
• Erosion regulation: Vegetative cover plays an important role in soil retention and the prevention of landslides 
and sedimentation of streams and rivers. 
 
• Natural hazard regulation: Ecosystems play an important role in modulating the effects of extreme events on 
human systems. E.g. soil stores large amounts of water, facilitate transfer of surface water to groundwater, 
and prevent or reduce flooding.  
Among environmental services for the provision of freshwater and its quality and quantity are:  
 
The aim of this study is to understand how access to water is established in order to point to how these 
access mechanisms might affect the introduction of PES arrangements and vice versa.  A better 
understanding of the linkages between PES and other rural institutions is a prerequisite for better 
designs of PES schemes and more equitable outcomes.  
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The following research questions have guided the study:   
• Which formal and informal institutions regulate access to water and land and how might that 
influence the introduction of PES schemes? 
• Which conflicts over access to water and land exist?  
• Who are the potential participants (environmental service providers and buyers) in PES schemes 
in Jequetepeque watershed?  
• What are the constraints and opportunities for the involvement of poor people in PES schemes?  
 
METHODOLOGY 
The present paper is based on research carried out between May and July 2005 to identify institutions 
shaping access to land and water and the competition and conflict over access to land and water.  Three 
sites were chosen for field work in Jequetepeque watershed, based on criteria of variation that should 
reflect divergence with respect to agricultural activities, altitude and ecological conditions. These factors 
were a priori assumed to determine the presence of different interests and practices in relation to water 
and land management. 
The study was delimited to focus on the provision of water ecosystem services for irrigation purposes. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants from regional to local water 
management institutions and ordinary local inhabitants2. Additionally, meetings and workshops on 
resource management in Jequetepeque watershed held by local NGOs were attended. Finally, 
secondary sources of information from Jequetepeque watershed were consulted.  
3. Description of Jequetepeque watershed and the 
research areas 
Jequetepeque watershed is located in the Northern part of Peru within the departments of Libertad 
(provinces of Pacasmayo and Chepén) and Cajamarca (provinces of Cajamarca, Contumazá, San Pablo 
 
2 A total of 82 interviews were carried out in the three areas where field research was conducted. 19 interviews were made 
with inhabitants in the areas of Comisión de Regantes de Tecapa and Comisión de Regantes de San Pedro, 21 interviews 
were made in the area of Comisión de Regantes de Magdalena and 29 interviews were made in the area of Comisión de 
Regantes de San Pedro. 13 interviews were made with key informants. 
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and San Miguel), comprising a total of 45 districts. The watershed covers 5,136 km2 and altitudes range 
from 0 and 4,188 m.a.s.l. In the coastal parts annual precipitation is less than 200 mm while it ranges 
between 500 - 1,100 mm in the upper part of the watershed. Based on the 1993 population census, the 
2006 population of the watershed is estimated to be approximately 306,000 persons.  
A reservoir named Gallito Ciego was constructed in 1987. With a storage capacity of 400 million m3 it 
increased considerably the reliability of water supply to the valley. However, the capacity of the 
reservoir has gradually decreased due to sedimentation. The reservoir marks the division of the 
watershed into an upper and a lower watershed management unit (referred to as the “upper part” and 
“lower part”)3.   
The upper part of the watershed covers 80% of the area, while the lower part covers the remaining 
20%. In the upper part, 25% of the land is cultivated or under pasture, 25% is forest and the rest either 
urban areas or unused land. In the lower part of the watershed, 54% is cultivated, 44% is classified as 
unused land and remaining 2% is urban areas. Of the cultivated area, 60% is estimated to be under 
irrigation in the upper part of the watershed. In the lower part of the watershed, all agricultural 
activities are based on irrigation.  In general the supply of water for irrigation is higher than the demand 
during the rainy season from January to May and lower than the demand during the dry period from 
June to December (Echeverry, 2003). Only sporadic data exists on access to potable water, but 
households in the upper part do, in general, have less access to piped and treated water compared to 
residents in the lower part of the watershed.  
The largest gold mine in South America is located in the highest part of Jequetepeque watershed. The 
presence of the mine plays an important role in the economic development of the urban economy. 
However, it has negative impact on the environment, including a reduced water quality in some areas of 
Jequetepeque watershed. 
The three selected research areas have the following characteristics. The first area is a micro-watershed 
located between 3,100 and 3,900 m.a.s.l., which forms part of the páramo ecosystem. Field work was 
conducted in the communities Jamcate, Shinshilpampa, Alto Chetilla and Maraypapmpa belonging to 
the Comisión de Regantes de Magdalena. The population density of the area is estimated to be 20 per 
km2.  Inhabitants are dedicated to milk production and agricultural activities (e.g. barley, wheat and 
Irish potatoes) under irrigation or rain fed. The micro-watershed is among the areas that has the highest 
 
3 The official name of watershed management units for irrigation are, in the lower part, ‘Junta de Usuarios de Jequetepeque 
Regulado’ and in the upper part, ‘Junta de Usuarios de Jequetepeque Non-regulado’. 
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levels of poverty within the watershed. The area is estimated to have a high water holding capacity 
which makes it relevant for the provision of environmental services to improve water regulation and 
natural hazard regulation. Furthermore, a reduction of erosion through restoration and maintenance of 
the vegetative cover is expected to reduce sedimentation of water bodies, particularly of the reservoir.  
The second area covers the administrative unit of Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo in the lower part 
of the upper Jequetepeque watershed. The area is located between 2,100 and 2,400 m.a.s.l. The 
population density is 85 per km2. The site forms part of the sub-watershed formed by the rivers 
Yaminchad and Puclush. Main crops include sugarcane, maize and pasture. At higher altitudes within 
the area, local farmers are dedicated to milk production. The area provides environmental services in 
terms of erosion regulation that decreases the sedimentation of the canals and the reservoir. At the 
same time, people in the area benefit from water regulation and erosion control provided in upstream 
areas.  
The third area is constituted by the administrative units of Comisión de Regantes de Tecapa and 
Comisión de Regantes de San Pedro, which are located in the lower part of Jequetepeque watershed at 
10-200 m a. s. l. The population density is 122 per km2.  The water sources stem from the outlet of the 
Gallito Ciego reservoir, and the main crop cultivated is irrigated rice. The area is, in general, 
characterised by high levels of well-being among the inhabitants compared to the rest of the watershed, 
although landless people or people possessing only a few hectares also reside in the area. The rice 
producers are beneficiaries of ecosystem services in terms of erosion regulation in the upper part of the 
watershed that decreases the sedimentation of the reservoir and prolong its life.  The area does not 
provide any water environmental services that are relevant for the programme.   
The three areas, in which field research was carried out, are a priori assessed to have the following 
streams of environmental services, forming the basis for potential payment schemes (Figure 1.):4
 
4 A water and soil assessment will determine which areas in the watershed are most relevant to restore due to their high 
ability to provide watershed environmental services.  
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Figure 1. Illustration of potential PES schemes in the three field research areas. 
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4.  Access to irrigation water 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON IRRIGATION 
The national water legislation for irrigation constitutes the framework which shapes access and 
management of water for irrigation and thereby also influences the circumstances under which 
PES schemes can be implemented. 
 The current organisation of larger irrigation systems is done by ‘sub-organisations’ at different 
levels (see Figure 2). Starting at the lowest level (tertiary canal), the general assembly of all water 
users at the level of each canal elects a board of comité de canal. The board’s main tasks are the 
water distribution and canal maintenance of the tertiary canals. A general assembly of water users 
at the level of the secondary canals chooses a board of commisión de regantes. The board of commisión 
de regantes carries out the water distribution and the maintenance of secondary canals and oversees 
tasks and obligations of the water users as well as the punishment for non-compliance. Not all de 
facto water users have an official vote in these general assemblies as it is required to be registered 
and the water user has to make use of the water him or herself. Finally, at the level of the main 
system is the junta de usuarios which is not elected directly by the waters users but consists of the 
heads and two delegates of each comisión de regantes. The board of directors of the junta de usuarios 
manage the main infrastructure and receive payment of the water fees from water users at the 
level of an irrigation system.  
Local governmental organisations are also important in the management of the irrigation water. 
The local irrigation office of the Ministry of Agriculture, Administración Técnica (ATDR) is 
responsible for the overall allocation of water in the irrigation system. The organisation Autoridad 
Autónoma de Cuenca Hidrográfica is mandated to coordinate water use at basin level and is 
independent from the local irrigation office.  
In the case of Jequetepeque watershed, the watershed is divided into two irrigations systems. 
Junta de Usuarios de Riego Regulado Jequetepeque, which is constituted by 10 comisiones de 
regantes (> 1000 irrigations cannels) and Junta de Usuarios del Alto Jequetepeque non-regulado”, 
which is made up by 13 comisiones de regantes (>3000 cannels). 
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Figure 2. Different layers of the water users’ organisations and the local governmental 
organizations 
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The current management system of irrigation water is built upon the Peruvian water law, Ley 
General de Aguas, introduced in 1969. Despite changes and additions, the water law still forms the 
major framework for water access and management. The main features are: 
• All kinds of water sources belong to the state, which works towards a water allocation for 
the general benefit of the society. In order to take advantage of water sources for irrigation 
purposes, users should possess a water title.  As stipulated in art. 29, two types of water 
titles can be established. Either water users can possess a licencia, which gives a permanent 
and secure right to water, or a permiso, which only gives rights to water if total available 
quantities exceed the needs of the holders of permanent water rights (licencia) (Consejo de 
Ministros del Peru, 1969). 
• Changes in ownerships of water titles are handled at the local irrigation office (ATDR). A 
list of water right holders (padrón de usuarios) should be kept at the local irrigation office as 
well as by the irrigation commission. According to the water law, the list may change due to 
transfers of titles between local inhabitants, but the total area with a  water title should, 
however, not be augmented (Vos, 2002).  
 
From the late eighties and onwards, a number of changes in water legislation for irrigation have 
occurred: 
• In 1989, water distribution and canal maintenance were transferred to the tertiary level 
(comité de canal) from the local irrigation office. Still, the control of the overall water 
allocation among water committees and beyond remained in the hands of the state (Vos, 
2002).  
• In 1998, the tie between water rights and land rights was removed and water rights could 
be sold separately from the land and vice versa.  
 
In 2003, a draft of a more profound revision of the water law from 1969 named Proyecto de Ley 
Orgánica de Aguas was launched. Central aspects of the proposed revision are: 
• It is confirmed that water continues to belong to the state. Water sources should serve the 
public interests and cannot be privatized and owned by any natural person or juridical 
person. 
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• The system of water titles (licencia and permiso) continues as under Ley General de Aguas.  
• The importance of understanding and assessing each watershed as a hydrological unit is 
emphasised and so is the need for integrating water management with the management of 
land and other natural resources.  
• The importance of involving civil society in the formulation, implementation and 
management of water management. 
• Finally, it is emphasised that  water has an economic value that should be estimated (Vos, 
2002; Zegarra, 2005)  .  
 
No specific reference is made to the importance of environmental services for the provision of 
water sources, but the ideas of watershed management in the proposed legislation can include 
economic instruments such as PES. A number of attempts to approve the new law have, 
however, failed due to opposition from certain stakeholders, especially the agrarian unions, and a 
general climate of political instability.  At the moment the law remains unapproved in parliament. 
WATER RIGHTS IN THE FIELD RESEARCH AREAS 
Formal as well as informal institutions and practises regulate the access to water for irrigation in 
Jequetepeque watershed. In the areas of Comisión de Regantes de Tecapa and Comisión de 
Regantes de San Pedro farming is based on irrigation.  Following the national system of water 
titles (licencia and permiso) the distribution of formal water rights is as follows: In the area of 
Comisión de Regantes de Tecapa access to water for irrigation is established through licencias for 
966 hectares (87% of the irrigated area), and through permisos for 197 hectares (13% of the 
irrigated area). In the area of Comisión de Regantes de San Pedro, access to irrigation water is 
established through licencias for 3,928 hectares (85% of the irrigated area) and through permisos for 
697 hectares (15% of the irrigated area) (see Table 1). The total number of water users with 
permisos and licencias is 523 farmers in Tecapa and 1,670 farmers in San Pedro.  
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Table 1.  Area with water rights in commissions of irrigators in the lower part of 
Jequetepeque watershed5
 
Subsector/ 
Comisión de 
Regantes 
Number of 
users 
 
Area with 
permanent 
water right 
(licencia) 
(ha) 
Area with 
right to 
excess water 
(permiso) 
(ha) 
Total area 
(ha) 
Pay Pay 103 238 12 250 
Ventanillas 96  296 19 315 
Tolón 320 1,096 126 1,222 
Huabal/Zapotal 275 592 55 646 
Tecapa 523 966 147 1,113 
San José 980 2,832 727 3.558 
San Pedro 1,670 3,928 697 4,625 
Jequetepeque 369 1,240 147 1,387 
Talambo 2,250 4,596 4,041 8,637 
Chepén 730 2,970 3 2,973 
Limoncarro 1,288 3,365 109 3,474 
Guadalupe 2,285 8,176 1,382 9,558 
Pacanga 1,044 2,227 2,585 4,811 
Total 11,933 32,522 10,049 42,571 
Source: (Carpio and Mejia 1996 in Vos, 2002). 
 
For the areas of Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo and Comisión de Regantes de Magdalena 
data on the distribution of water rights for irrigation among farmers is not available.  
The type of water rights held for irrigation, influences the quantities and the probability of 
receiving water, and thereby farmers’ ability to cultivate. Informants from the areas of Comisión 
de Regantes de San Pablo, Comisión de Regantes de Tecapa and Comisión de Comisión de 
Regantes de Tecapa perceived their opportunities to cultivate to be closely related with the type 
of water rights they possessed, if any, and whether it gave them secure access to adequate 
quantities and timing of water. According to informants from the area of Comisión de Regantes 
de Magdalena, water scarcity is, to a lesser extent, considered an obstacle to farming 
opportunities, although variations in water availability exists between villages.  
In the areas of Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo, Comisión de Regantes de Tecapa and 
Comisión de Regantes de San Pedro, farmers who possess licencia have the opportunity to 
cultivate two crops annually, while farmers who hold a permiso face insecure access to water and 
 
5  Please note that the table depicts the situation before the de-coupling of land and water rights. 
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may therefore have to limit their agricultural activities if they estimate their chances for getting 
sufficient water during a particular season are low. A farmer from the Comisión de Regantes de 
San Pablo holding a permiso explained the unequal access as follows: 
“Aquí la distribución del agua es muy injusta. No tengo agua para dos campañas. Es 
imposible obtener una licencia si uno no tiene.  La gente no quiere negociar sus horas 
de riego. ¿Qué puedo hacer?” (Farmer, Iglesia Pampa, Comisión de Regantes de San 
Pablo).  
The quoted farmer had a large parts of his land in areas with cemented cannels and water 
flowing. Yet, due to only holding a permiso, he faced insecure access which made it difficult for 
him to plan his agricultural activities. The described situation is very common in the lower parts 
of the sub-watershed of San Pablo province and was, to a lesser extent, also encountered in the 
research areas in the coastal areas.  
As explained by a neighbouring farmer from the same village there is a great unwillingness to 
renegotiate the allocated water rights: 
”Es una costumbre desde antes, que venimos nosotros llevando esa forma de riego. 
Ya conocemos nuestros días de riego. Nos respetamos cada usuario; tenemos 
nuestros días de riego, regamos así cada quince días  según nuestros derechos; cada 
terreno tiene su derecho de agua, su turno; nos respetamos y entre vecinos nos 
llevamos bien. Si una familia viene a pedir más agua no le puede dar. Ya no hay. 
Todo está distribuido, comienza y termina, termina y comienza, así da la vuelta. Todo 
ya está empadronado. No se pude pedir más sin quitar el agua de otro. Ya está 
repartida el agua según costumbre. La gente se ha posicionado fuerte y no quiere 
dejar esas costumbres. Por ejemplo si uno compra terreno que no tiene licencia o 
permiso va a tener problemas, por que los que tienen agua allí se sienten dueños del 
agua” (Farmer, Iglesia Pampa, Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo).  
The two quotes illustrate the competition over water taking place at the local level, as farmers do 
face different opportunities depending on the type of water right they hold. In addition, despite 
the recent change in legislation, of which many apparently are unaware, in practice water rights 
continue to be linked to land rights and hence, water and land rights are not sold separately.  
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It is important to emphasise that flows of water in different parts of the upper part of the 
watershed vary between areas. Some areas rely only on water harvesting from rivers while other 
areas also benefit from infiltrations and springs on specific land plots. At the same time, the 
sharing of water for irrigation is not only unequal in terms of the type of right held, but also in 
terms of the quantities of water entailed in the right, in the sense that some pieces of land are 
allocated two to three times the amounts of water per land unit as compared to other pieces of 
land with a licencia. As described by the water engineer from San Pablo district, within the same 
village you may find a farmer with 500m2 having licencia for six hours of water while the 
neighbour with two hectares of land is also limited to six hours of water. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PES OF DIFFERENTIAL WATER ACCESS  
It is important to consider how existing water rights might impact the establishment of PES 
schemes. As illustrated, farmers do experience different access to water for irrigation according to 
the type and the contents of the rights they hold and thereby how secure their access to water is. 
The  issue of secure water rights – i.e. “the assurance that one will receive benefits in the future” (Bruns et 
al., 2005) – matters as it affects incentives to invest in and conserve the water resource. In the 
case of beneficiaries of watershed services in Jequetepeque the above-mentioned examples 
highlight the need for a more profound understanding of potential beneficiaries’ understandings 
of how secure their water rights are.  
Farmers, who today face insecure access to irrigation water, may be difficult to persuade to pay 
for environmental services if no guarantees are made that amounts of water harvested will 
increase or at least be more predictable in the future. If only holders of the more secure licencias to 
irrigation water pay for the provision of environmental services, this will further strengthen their 
water claims vis-à-vis the permiso holders. Yet, on the other hand, the possibility exists that holders 
of a permiso might perceive participation in a PES scheme as a strategy to strengthen their claims 
for a more secure access to irrigation water. In other words, the launching of a PES scheme 
might provide an opportunity to open up for (re-)negotiations of water rights in the watershed. 
Both scenarios indicate that PES arrangements are likely to influence current power relations 
between different types of water rights holders in the watershed.  
Besides carefully paying attention to the extent to which the possible introduction of PES 
arrangements influences the distribution and the security of water rights, it is important – from a 
poverty perspective – to examine the correlation between the level of poverty and the type and 
contents of the water rights held.  
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PAYMENT OF WATER FEES AND ILLEGAL USE OF WATER  
The following paragraphs present the findings from the three research areas on non-compliance 
with the obligation to pay water fees as well as practices of illegal use of water that farmers are 
not entitled to. Examples are drawn from the upper part of the watershed, especially in the area 
of Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo, where these practices are most widespread.  
A central element of the national system of water rights administration is the payment of water 
fees. Each water right holder should pay an annual fee to the Junta de Usuarios de Jequetepeque 
Non-regulado or Junta de Usuarios de Jequetepeque Regulado. In the areas below the reservoir 
the available volume of irrigation water is estimated on a weekly basis. In the upper part, the 
annual water fee is calculated on the basis of a combination of the number of hours that water is 
allocated to each farmer and the farmer’s agricultural plan, which describes the crops to be 
cultivated.  
However, particularly in the areas of Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo and Comisión de 
Regantes de Magdalena, a large number of holders of permisos or licencias in registered canals 
actually do not pay the fees. Informants explained their scepticism to start paying fees for water to 
be a matter of unreliable delivery of water. As explained by an informant, holding a licencia right 
to irrigation water: 
“Yo espero filtraciones de la parte alta. Pero si no hay filtraciones el canal queda sin 
agua y sería injusto que yo pague. Si hubiera agua asegurada, obligara a la gente a 
pagar. Debemos aportar al estado. Pero solamente cuando uno recibe algo” (Farmer, 
Chorro Blanco, Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo). 
As explained by informants in the areas of Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo and Comisión de 
Regantes de Magdalena, the individuals’ unwillingness to pay can be attributed to the fact that 
water authorities are not very present in the villages. The comisiones de regantes and Junta de 
Usuarios that hold the responsibility for regulating and controlling water use, do not possess 
sufficient capacity to carry out the monitoring of water users’ compliance with rules and 
regulations. Yet, a majority of the informants acknowledged that they believed the tariff system 
could be beneficial if the authorities started enforcing the payment of water fees and supported 
further improvements of the infrastructure of the canal system.  
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Part of the problem can be explained by the illegal use of water that takes place in areas where 
people do possess rights but use more water than their right entitles them to. The problem is 
especially prevalent in the upper part of the sub-watershed in the area of Comisión de Regantes 
de San Pablo where a process of conversion of land to pasture as fodder for diary cattle has taken 
place in recent years. The market for milk is, in economic terms, attractive relative to the 
production of agricultural products such as cereals and maize, particularly due to the reliable 
income obtained from milk sales to commercial companies. This has led to an increasing use of 
water exceeding far beyond the amounts allocated through the existing licencia and permiso rights 
system. Areas in the lower part of the sub-watershed therefore increasingly face a situation of 
water scarcity. As explained by a sugarcane producer: 
“La situación de escasez de agua de San Pablo es por causa de la extensión pecuaria 
en la parte alta. Si el agua llegaría para nosotros no hubieran tanta pobreza, arriba se 
dedican a la leche. El problema es que el agua no alcanza para nosotros. Nuestras 
horas de riego no serviría para nada. La gente más arriba cogen la mayor parte del 
agua. Regamos cada veintiún día pero ya que está disminuyendo el agua, el presidente 
del comité de canal a veces prolonga el turno a veintiocho días. Antes la mayoría 
[arriba] no regaban, pero ahora todos se han puesto a regar”. (Farmer, El Ingenio, 
Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo)  
A large number of illegal cannels, i.e. canals which have never been approved (and might not be 
in the future), have been constructed in parts of the area, and users of these canals, therefore, do 
not pay water fees.  
In order to respond to the weak management and control of water for irrigation, local farmers 
have set up their own control system. In order to secure the water flows, what is locally termed 
“water guardians” are found in many areas. Water users pay a guardian to control that no water 
harvesting upstream takes place without permission. The practice has been established as a local 
response to water robbery. As explained by an informant from the lower part of the area: 
 “Muchos nos quieren robar el agua porque se les faltan agua. Uno dice, voy a robar 
el agua y corta el canal o usa una moto bomba. Para que yo pueda traerlo tengo que 
poner guardianes en el mismo río después más acá, en la travesía y cuesta caro pués. 
Tenemos que pagar nuestros guardianes para que esa agua venga. Para nosotros es 
demasiado costoso pagar estos guardianes. Un guardián no cuesta menos de treinta 
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soles mensual. Ellos son personas claves para que el agua venga”. (Farmer, El 
Ingenio, Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo)  
In conclusion, the formal regulation of water use, especially in the upper part of the watershed is 
weak. In many villages, water users do not pay fees for the water they are allocated, or they 
withdraw water to which they are not entitled according to existing water rights.  
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PES SCHEMES  
The issue of water robbery illustrates the competition that exists over scarce water sources for 
irrigation purposes and the weak regulation of water use taking place in the watershed.  The fact 
that water users in many parts either do not pay water fees or withdraw water without the 
support of formal water use rights thus constitutes an enormous challenge for the establishment 
of PES schemes.  
As indicated in figure 1, farmers in the area of Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo can be 
considered potential buyers of environmental services from areas at higher altitudes. The current 
situation of illegal water use and lack of payment of fees for legally endorsed water use indicate 
great risks for implementing a PES system based on individual payments. To assess whether this 
illegal access to water will affect the willingness to pay for water environmental services, it is 
important to understand more profoundly the motives underlying the current situation of illegal 
access and lack of payments for legal use of water. In particular, a better understanding of who 
enjoys illegal access to water – i.e. the poor or the non-poor; farmers with secure water rights 
(licencia), with insecure water rights (permiso), or without any water rights – is fundamental to 
assess the poverty impact of strengthening water rights administration in general and introducing 
PES schemes in particular. Just adding another environmental fee on top of an already existing 
but contested fee would appear to be a strategy with little scope of success.  
LAND TENURE RIGHTS AND THE PROVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
SERVICES  
The micro-watershed belonging to Comisión de Regantes de Magdalena and the area of the 
administrative unit of Comisión de Regantes de San Pablo are potential areas for provision of 
environmental services in the PES programme (cf. figure 1). The following aspects in relation to 
land tenure are considered important for the possible implementation of PES. 
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Holders of private property rights often do not hold legally recognized titles and therefore 
consider their land rights as insecure. Many informants explained that they had not registered 
their titles to land when inheriting family land or by other means became de facto owners of land 
as the registration was found too expensive and complicated. This leaves people exposed to 
claims made by others. Some villages, especially in the area of Comisión de Regantes de 
Magdalena, do have land registered as comunidad campesina, which means that land is collectively 
owned by the community. In these communities, conflicts were identified between inhabitants 
who claim land to be collectively owned (comunidad campesina) and inhabitants who claim to have 
private property rights to land within these communities.  
Unclear tenure rights might be an obstacle for the implementation of PES schemes as it 
constraints the establishment of contracts. It might be necessary to find ways to deal with that, 
e.g. through rewarding people clear and secure land rights as part of a PES scheme. For example 
in the Philippines a PES programme facilitated the granting of clear land titles as a part of a 
“reward” for entering into the scheme (Rosales, 2003). This might of course be a conflictual 
process and, obviously, requires the involvement and support from national institutions. 
Having collective rights to land, however, is not in itself problematic. As mentioned by (Swallow 
et al., 2005)  it may prove to be more efficient to enter contracts with groups of farmers rather 
than setting up contracts with  individual farmers as the internal control is greater and might 
require less monitoring by third parries.  
According to data from the Agricultural Ministry, land distribution is highly skewed in the watershed. 
Data from 32 communities in the upper part of the watershed revealed that 9% of the families own 
more than 10 hectares, whereas another 9% do not own any land. The majority of families in the 32 
communities own less than one hectare (29%), or between one and 2.5. hectare (28%) (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Land ownership in 32 communities in the upper part of Jequetepeque 
watershed. 
 
Size of land  Percent families 
Do not own land 9% 
Own < 1 ha 29% 
Own < 2.5 ha and >1 ha 28% 
Own  < 5 ha and > 2.5 ha 16% 
Own < 10  and > 5 ha 9% 
Own > 10 ha 9% 
Total 100% 
Source: (Echeverry, 2003) 
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Owning small plots might be an obstacle for entering into PES schemes. Small holders might be 
less willing to set aside land or change practices on land on which they base their living. 
Furthermore, they might lack access to sufficient resources to enter into PES schemes. For 
instance the need for economic resources to cover the cost of using an intermediary organisation 
or the time lag from submitting an application to receiving  PES payments (Miranda et al., 2003). 
The area of Comisión de Regantes de Magdalena is located in the páramo. While people are 
attached to villages,  those who raise cattle use the surrounding zones of state land in the páramo 
as a “secondary” area for grazing dairy cattle, cutting of timber and firewood collection. 
According to a recent study (GTZ-CONDESAN, 2004) an increasing area of the páramo is used 
by local inhabitants, who set up camps and thus reside with their animals outside the community 
part of the year. If hydrological studies confirm that these parts of the páramo are important to 
ensure or improve the water environmental services of the watershed, it will be necessary to 
better understand the impact that these activities of grazing animals, firewood collection and 
harvesting of timber have on water flows.  
A central aspect to consider before starting to pay for changing land use of the páramo is where 
to draw the line between rewarding people for providing environmental services by not using 
land if they in fact are obligated by regulations not to cut down the forest, open up new land or 
graze their animals in these areas.  
5.  Concluding remarks 
As shown through the present case study, the administration and enforcement of the national 
regulations on water rights and use is weak and in several cases non-existing. This means that 
mandatory water use fees are not paid, that illegal canals are constructed and that some farmers 
use more water than they are entitled to.  
The weaknesses in the enforcement of the national water rights administration for irrigation 
water constitute a major challenge to the establishment of PES schemes in the watershed. 
• The transaction costs of certification, monitoring and enforcement of contracts between 
buyers and sellers are at risk for being too high. 
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• Secure rights are a pre-condition for the PES market on the supply and the demand site. 
On the supply side, it should be considered to which extent the current land tenure rights, 
of which many remain without legal documents, will affect negatively the possibility of 
establishing schemes. On the supply side, it should be considered how a more secure 
delivery of water to water right holders will improve the security of their rights. 
Furthermore, the current system where some hold licencias and others permisos might cause 
some water right holders to be willing to participate while others do not wish to be 
involved. As all water users benefit from the same source a free-rider problem might occur.   
• The inequality of access to water is another central obstacle to the implementation of PES 
schemes in the watershed. It lies outside the objectives of the programme to renegotiate 
the unequal water rights existing in many parts of the watershed. Yet, if PES schemes are 
established, it might be problematic if these legitimize the current unequal distribution and 
thereby create further tensions between neighbours as, often, holders of licencias, permisos 
and users without any rights live side by side.  
• In addition, prices on land that goes with a water right are high compared to land without 
such rights. As a consequence, poor people’s ability to access land with water rights 
becomes limited, not least in a context of increasing population density and competition 
over water. For many poor local inhabitants this means that they can only access water for 
irrigation if they work as sharecroppers, i.e. partidario, on other people’s land. There seems 
to be indications that small parcels and lack of water rights are central aspects hindering 
poor people from increasing their livelihood situations. Ultimately, this will influence the 
possibility of involving poor people on the beneficiary side in PES schemes.  
• PES is first and foremost an environmental management tool.  It might have pro-poor 
impacts but experiences from PES schemes elsewhere document that making PES pro-
poor is neither easy nor always desirable (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Pagiola et al., 
2005). In Jequetepeque watershed the poorest landless cannot be expected to benefit from 
a scheme as they cannot be targeted as providers of services. To reach them as beneficiaries 
of improved water services is also questionable as they do not possess water rights or have 
access to capital to pay for improved water services. The extent to which they would 
become worse off (e.g. through restricted access to land in the páramo or less access to 
water) should be closely monitored during implementation of the programme.  
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• One of the major constraints for including the ‘moderately poor’ on the supply side is the 
higher transaction cost of dealing with many smaller land plots as compared to fewer larger 
landowners. However, (Swallow et al., 2005) draw attention to ways to deal  with the 
seemingly higher  transaction cost when dealing with individual smallholders. For instance 
through the establishment of smallholder user groups or cooperatives that can assume the 
(higher) transaction costs of developing and enforcing contracts with more individuals than 
when dealing with fewer larger farmers. Moreover, one might find that opportunity costs 
of land belonging to wealthier farmers are so high that these farmers might not find it 
attractive to enter into PES schemes as suppliers, while less wealthy farmers might find it 
attractive.  
• In Jequetepeque, the more powerful actors – for obvious reasons – appear unwilling to 
negotiate water rights and a changed sharing of water. It should be expected that streams 
of benefits (cash to providers and improved environmental services) are likely to create 
incentives for elites to take over land or strengthen their water rights. Thus safeguards need 
to be included to guard against elite capture.  
• Negotiations over the establishment of PES schemes can be a conflictual process. Even 
when all relevant stakeholders are identified and agree to attend a common platform it is 
unrealistic to make everyone set aside their conflicting personal and/or institutional 
interests. Even if the opportunity to ‘speak out’ is equal for all, the possibilities to make 
claims, criticize and influence are not. Hence, careful negotiations should be cautiously 
facilitated when establishing PES schemes in Jequetepeque watershed. Intermediaries 
should play a crucial role as brokers between upstream and downstream stakeholders and 
the different interests among these. 
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